Hidalgo v. Amateur Athletic Union by Southern Methodist University
1 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




  Plaintiff, 
 
 - against - 
 
AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, INC., 
 









OPINION & ORDER 
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge: 
 The defendant, the Amateur Athletic Union of the United 
States, Inc. (the “AAU”), moves to compel arbitration on the 
claims brought by the plaintiff, Timothy Hidalgo, for common law 
negligence, negligence per se, and breach of implied contract, 
as well as for statutory violations of the New York General 
Business Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) and the Rhode Island 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-1. All 
the plaintiff’s claims arise out of a data breach that allegedly 
resulted in financial losses, identity theft, and other injuries 
to people, like the plaintiff, who had personal information, 
including credit card and debit card information, stored with 
the AAU. The defendant also moves to stay this litigation 
pending arbitration. 
 For the reasons that follow, the defendant’s motion to 
compel arbitration and its motion to stay this action pending 
arbitration are granted. 




 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise 
indicated. 
A. 
 The AAU is a non-profit, volunteer-based, multi-sport event 
organization that promotes and develops amateur sports and 
physical fitness programs for youths and adults. Kimbrell Decl. 
¶ 2. Individuals may apply to become members of the AAU as 
athletes or non-athletes; the latter category includes coaches, 
administrators, managers, instructors, and officials. Id. 
Individuals may apply for AAU membership by filling out an 
online application at https://aausports.org (the “Website”). Id. 
at ¶¶ 3, 6 & Ex. A. 
The AAU online membership application contains many 
questions that require the applicant to answer. At the end of 
the application is a section that is replicated here: 
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Kimbrell Decl., Ex. A. 
Before submitting the application by clicking the green 
“Continue” button in the bottom right corner, an applicant must, 
among other things, check a box that appears to the immediate 
left of the words “*I understand and agree to all terms and 
conditions listed.” Kimbrell Decl. at ¶¶ 6-8 (bold and color in 
original). The check box and the accompanying text appear at the 
bottom of a yellow box in the application immediately below the 
bold heading “Terms and Conditions – Digital Signature.” Id. 
(bold in original). One of the statements in the “terms and 
conditions” section of the application is the statement that 
Membership in any category may be granted only after 
an application is submitted and approved. By 
submitting an application, the applicant agrees to 
comply with the provisions of the AAU Code, including 
its constitution, bylaws, policies, procedures, 
regulations, and rules. 
 
Id. at ¶ 7 (color in original). The blue text is a hyperlink 
that takes the applicant to a separate “AAU Code Book” screen. 
Id. at ¶ 8. Also in the “terms and conditions” section is the 
statement “*I accept all terms and conditions for this AAU 
membership application as laid out by the AAU code book 
(available here) and this application.” Id. (color in original). 
The blue text, “available here,” is another hyperlink that takes 
the applicant to the same AAU Code Book screen. Id. 
Additionally, in the green box in the “terms and conditions” 
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section of the application is the statement “By entering my name 
below, I hereby authorize AAU to create the requested 
membership, accept and acknowledge all terms and conditions 
presented to me during the application process.” Id. at Ex. A. 
 Regardless which of the two hyperlinks one uses to access 
the AAU Code Book screen from the application page, the 
resulting page that a user is taken to displays the table of 
contents of the AAU Code Book. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11 & Ex. B. On the 
table of contents page, a complete PDF version of the AAU Code 
Book can be accessed by clicking on a button near the top of the 
AAU Code Book screen labeled “Complete Book.” Id. at Ex. B. The 
AAU Code Book screen also contains hyperlinks to each chapter 
contained within the AAU Code Book, one of which is titled 
“Policies.” Id. Adjacent to the “Policies” heading in the table 
of contents on the AAU Code Book screen is a hyperlink that 
reads “AAU National Policies of the AAU.” Id. (underline and 
color in original). In the “Policies” section of the table of 
contents, the first subheading is labeled “Membership Policy” 
and a sub-subheading below the “Membership Policy” subheading is 
labeled “Binding Arbitration.” Id. Upon clicking on the 
hyperlink labeled “AAU National Policies of the AAU,” the web 
user is then directed to a screen that displays the specific 
pages of the larger AAU Code Book containing the “AAU National 
Policies.” Id. at ¶¶ 11-12 & Ex. C. 
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 The “Binding Arbitration” provision contained in the AAU 
National Policies, which appears in bold text and in capital 
letters, reads as follows: 
B. BINDING ARBITRATION 
 
1. BY APPLYING FOR AAU MEMBERSHIP (OR HAVING A THIRD 
PARTY SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE 
AAU ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT), OR UPON ENTERING 
ANY AAU EVENT, THE APPLICANT/MEMBER/ENTRANT AND THE 
AAU AGREE TO SUBMIT ALL CIVIL DISPUTE(S) ARISING OUT 
OF OR DURING THE TERM OF MEMBERSHIP TO BINDING 
ARBIRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION (“AAA”) IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION RULES. THE ARBITRATION HEARING SHALL BE 
HELD IN NEW YORK, NEW YORK BEFORE ONE (1) 
ARBITRATOR. 
2. DEPOSITION(S), REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS ARE STRICTLY 
DISCOURAGED AND WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WITHOUT AN ORDER 
FROM AAA; AND, IN ORDER TO BE CONSIDERED, A REQUEST 
FOR ANY SUCH ORDER, IF ANY, SHALL ACCOMPANY THE 
FILING OF THE APPLICABLE PARTY’S FIRST SUBMISSION TO 
AAA OR SUCH REQUEST SHALL BE WAIVED AND/OR DENIED. A 
LIST OF WITNESSES AND ALL EXHIBITS TO BE INTRODUCED 
AT THE HEARING WILL BE EXCHANGED AT LEAST TWENTY 
(20) DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEARING. THE PARTIES AGREE 
THAT THE BINDING ARBITRATION SHALL BE IN LIEU OF ANY 
LITIGATION BY AND BETWEEN ALL OF THE PARTIES RELATED 
TO THE DISPUTE. 
3. THE PARTIES DECLARE THAT IT IS THEIR CLEAR AND 
UNMISTAKABLE INTENT FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO DETERMINE 
ANY AND ALL QUESTIONS OF ARBITRABILITY, IF ANY. ANY 
OBJECTION TO THE ARBITRATOR’S JURISDICTION, 
INCLUDING ANY OBJECTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 
EXISTENCE, SCOPE OR VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT SHALL BE DECIDED BY THE ARBITRATOR. 
4. THE PARTIES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN 
LEGAL FEES, COSTS AND COST OF WITNESSES. THE PARTIES 
WILL SHARE EQUALLY THE ARBITRATOR’S FEES AND COSTS. 
THE PARTIES WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO SEEK AND THE PARTIES 
COVENANT NOT TO SEEK, ANY PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY 
DAMAGES. 
 
Id. at ¶ 13 & Ex. C. 
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On May 16, 2019, the plaintiff applied for membership with 
the AAU by filling out an application on the Website. Kimbrell 
Decl. ¶ 4.1 The plaintiff used his debit card to pay the $32.00 
fee for a coach’s certificate at the time he submitted his 
application. Compl. ¶ 19. The plaintiff applied for membership 
by accessing the Website on the Safari web browser application 
on his iPhone. Hidalgo Decl. ¶¶ 4-7. Because he used his iPhone 
to complete the membership application the plaintiff allegedly 
“had to move the screen back and forth for each line of text. By 
pinching [his] fingers together on the screen [he] could zoom 
out and see more of the Application, but even then the full 
application was not visible and it would pop back to the 
misconfigured size when [he] lifted [his] fingers from the 
screen.” Id. at ¶ 7 & Ex. A. Nevertheless, the plaintiff states 
that the image of the membership application reproduced above 
“may well be essentially the same as the application [he] filled 
out in May 2019, although . . . due to the lack of mobile 
compatibility, he never saw it formatted as a unified document.” 
Id. at ¶ 8. The plaintiff states that he “remember[s] a section 
that talked about terms and conditions for background check and 
another yellow box that talked about terms and conditions of 
 
1 The plaintiff alleges that he applied for membership with the AAU on or 
about May 17, 2019. Compl. ¶ 19. The defendant alleges that the May 16, 2019 
date comes from a review of business records maintained by the AAU in the 
ordinary course of business. Kimbrell Decl. ¶ 4. Any discrepancy between the 
two dates is not material in this case. 
Case 1:19-cv-10545-JGK   Document 27   Filed 06/16/20   Page 7 of 30
8 
 
membership. The second terms and conditions box talked about how 
membership was not guaranteed by just filling out the 
application and that members had to comply with the AAU Code and 
its constitution and rules.” Id. at ¶ 10. 
When the plaintiff applied for membership he necessarily 
checked the box in the “terms and conditions” section adjacent 
to the statement “*I understand and agree to all terms and 
conditions listed” because, had he not checked the box, an error 
message would have popped up on the screen when he attempted to 
click the “Continue” button at the bottom right of the 
application. Kimbrell Decl. ¶ 9. The plaintiff’s membership was 
accepted by the AAU on May 29, 2019, roughly two weeks after he 
applied, and the plaintiff thereafter became eligible to 
participate in the AAU’s youth program as a coach or other kind 
of volunteer. Hidalgo Decl. ¶ 16 & Ex. B. 
B. 
 Private information, including credit and debit card 
information, of individuals who conducted transactions on the 
Website between October 1, 2018 and July 2, 2019, including that 
information from the plaintiff, was subject to a data breach 
that the AAU publicly disclosed in September 2019. Compl. ¶ 3. 
The plaintiff generally alleged in the Complaint that the AAU 
“failed to take reasonable steps to employ adequate security 
measures or to properly protect sensitive payment Personal 
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Information” and that in the aftermath of the breach, AAU’s 
actions in remedying the injuries of victims of the breach were 
inadequate. See generally id. at ¶¶ 33-66. 
On November 13, 2019, the plaintiff brought this case as a 
class action on behalf of “[a]ll residents of the United States 
whose Personal Information was compromised as a result of the 
data breach first disclosed by AAU in September 2019.” Id. at 
¶ 67. The plaintiff brought claims for common-law negligence, 
negligence per se, breach of implied contract, unjust 
enrichment, violations of the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, §§ 6-13.1-1 et seq., and violations of the New 
York General Business Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §  349(a). Id. at 
¶¶ 78-134. 
The defendant now moves moves pursuant to the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., to compel 
arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims and stay the case pending 
arbitration. 
II. 
 Under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 4, “a district court must enter 
an order to arbitrate upon being satisfied that the making of 
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith 
is not in issue.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 n.27 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). A 
court considering whether to compel arbitration pursuant to a 
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purported arbitration agreement must decide “(1) whether there 
exists a valid agreement to arbitrate at all under the contract 
in question . . . and if so, (2) whether the particular dispute 
sought to be arbitrated falls within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement.” Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Swiss 
Reinsurance Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
“The determination of whether parties have contractually 
bound themselves to arbitrate a dispute – a determination 
involving interpretation of state law – is a legal conclusion.” 
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 
2002) (Sotomayor, J.). Thus, “[w]hen deciding whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter,” courts generally 
“should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 
formation of contracts.” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 
514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also Rightnour v. Tiffany & Co., 
239 F. Supp. 3d 744, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). “It is a basic 
tenet of contract law that, in order to be binding, a contract 
requires a ‘meeting of the minds’ and a manifestation of mutual 
assent.’” Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 288 (2d 
Cir. 2019).2 “When an offeree does not have actual notice of 
certain contract terms, he is nevertheless bound by such terms 
 
2 The parties agree that New York law should govern in this case. 
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if he is on inquiry notice of them and assents to them through 
conduct that a reasonable person would understand to constitute 
assent.” Id. at 289 (emphasis in original). 
“New commerce on the Internet . . . has not fundamentally 
changed the principles of contract.” Register.com v. Verio, 
Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004). Applying ordinary 
contract law principles, courts routinely uphold “‘clickwrap’ 
(or ‘clickthrough’) agreements, which require users to click an 
‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms and 
conditions of use” “for the principal reason that the user has 
affirmatively assented to the terms of agreement by clicking ‘I 
agree.’” Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 
2017) (applying California law but noting that New York and 
California apply substantially the same rules for determining 
whether there has been mutual assent necessary to form a 
contract). However, in order to be bound by an arbitration 
agreement contained in a clickwrap agreement, the web-user must 
have “reasonable notice of the arbitration provision.” Starke, 
913 F.3d at 292; see also Feld v. Postmates, Inc., -- F. Supp. 
3d --, 2020 WL 1047055, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2020). 
Upon satisfying itself that an agreement to arbitrate 
exists, the district court must then decide whether the claims 
at issue are within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See 
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74. When there are issues concerning the 
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scope of an arbitration agreement and whether particular 
disputes sought to be arbitrated fall within that scope, also 
known as issues of arbitrability, those issues are generally 
“for judicial determination ‘unless the parties clearly and 
unmistakably provide otherwise.’” NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS 
Securities, LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1031 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)); 
see also Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol., Co., Ltd., 398 F.3d 205, 
208-09 (2d Cir. 2005). 
“In deciding motions to compel, courts should apply a 
‘standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary 
judgment.’” Nicosia v. Amazon.com, 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d 
Cir. 2003)). Thus, a court should “consider all relevant, 
admissible evidence submitted by the parties and contained in 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with affidavits” and “must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks, alteration and citations omitted). 
The court must order arbitration “if there is no genuine issue 
of material fact regarding the requirements to compel 
arbitration.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg v. Beelman 
Truck Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d 312, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 




The first question is whether the plaintiff and the 
defendant entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to 
arbitrate. With respect to this question, the parties dispute 
only whether the plaintiff had “reasonable notice” of the 
arbitration provision contained in the AAU Code Book sufficient 
for the plaintiff to manifest assent to the terms of the 
arbitration provision by virtue of completing the AAU membership 
application and becoming a member of the AAU. 
A. 
When determining whether a plaintiff assented to the terms 
of a web-based contract, courts “look to the design and content 
of the relevant interface to determine if the contract terms 
were presented to the offeree in a way that would put her on 
inquiry notice of such terms.” Starke, 913 F.3d at 289. In a 
series of recent cases, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Meyer v. Uber 
Technologies, and Starke v. SquareTrade, the Court of Appeals 
has developed a framework for determining whether a web user has 
“reasonable notice” of an arbitration provision contained in a 
document that can be accessed through a hyperlink provided to 
the user. See Starke, 913 F.3d at 292 (“The reasoning of Nicosia 
and Meyer provides the framework within which we analyze the 
validity of assent to terms and conditions presented through a 
web interface.”).  
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In Nicosia, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff 
had plausibly pleaded that he was not bound by Amazon.com’s 
Conditions of Use when he placed an online order.3 The Amazon.com 
order page contained language near the top of the page that “By 
placing your order, you agree to Amazon.com’s privacy notice and 
conditions of use,” where “privacy notice” and conditions of 
use” were hyperlinks in blue font. Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235-36, 
241. In finding that the plaintiff had plausibly pleaded that 
there was no constructive notice of Amazon.com’s conditions of 
use, the Court of Appeals noted a number of facts about the 
layout of the Amazon.com order page that, taken together, 
deprived the plaintiff of “reasonable notice” of the conditions 
of use that would purportedly become binding upon placing an 
order with Amazon.com. These facts included that “the critical 
sentence appears in smaller font” than the “Review your order 
heading”; “unlike typical ‘clickwrap’ agreements, clicking 
‘Place your order’ does not specifically manifest assent to the 
additional terms, for the purchaser is not specifically asked 
whether she agrees or to say ‘I agree’”; the message alerting a 
user that placing the order constituted agreement to be bound by 
the conditions of use was not “bold, capitalized, or conspicuous 
in light of the whole webpage”; and the page itself contained 
 
3 The court in Nicosia applied Washington law to the question of contract 
formation, but “Washington law is the same as New York law with respect to 
the issue of contract formation.” Starke, 913 F.3d at 290 n.7. 
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“between fifteen and twenty-five links on the Order Page, and 
various text is displayed in at least four font sizes and six 
colors . . . alongside multiple buttons and promotional 
advertisements.” Id. at 235-37. 
In Meyer, the Court of Appeals enforced an arbitration 
provision contained in the “terms of service & privacy policy” 
that could be accessed on the registration screen of the Uber 
smartphone application. 868 F.3d at 81. In finding that a user 
would have reasonable notice of the existence of the arbitration 
provision, the Court of Appeals noted at the outset that 
“precedent and basic principles of contract law instruct that we 
consider the perspective of a reasonably prudent smartphone 
user,” and that “a reasonably prudent smartphone user knows that 
text that is highlighted in blue and underlined is hyperlinked 
to another webpage where additional information will be found.” 
Id. at 77-78. The Court of Appeals found that the Uber 
smartphone interface provided “reasonable notice” based on a 
number of facts about the layout of the interface, namely that 
the screen was “uncluttered”; the “text, including the 
hyperlinks to the Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy, 
appears directly below the buttons for registration”; “the dark 
print contrasts with the bright white background, and the 
hyperlinks are in blue and underlined”; the “notice of the Terms 
of Service is provided simultaneously to enrollment”; and 
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“[o]nce a user clicks through to the Terms of Service, the 
section heading (‘Dispute Resolution’) and the sentence waiving 
the user’s right to a jury trial on relevant claims are both 
bolded.” Id. at 78-79. 
In Starke, the Court of Appeals found that a user did not 
have reasonable notice of an arbitration provision that could be 
accessed through a “terms and conditions” hyperlink contained in 
the confirmation email of a purchase made on Amazon.com. 913 
F.3d at 285. In finding that the plaintiff did not have 
reasonable notice of the provision that could be accessed 
through the “terms and conditions” hyperlink, the Court of 
Appeals noted that the company that sought to compel arbitration 
had “never directed Starke’s attention to the ‘Terms & 
Conditions’ hyperlink that contained the post-Sale T&C”; the 
information unrelated to the terms and conditions hyperlink 
“took up approximately half of the email”; the hyperlink itself 
“is some of the smallest text in the email and comes after 
several prompts unrelated to the enclosure of the contract”; the 
“interface here is cluttered with diverse text, displayed in 
multiple colors, sizes and fonts, and features various buttons 
and promotional advertisements that distract the reader from the 
relevant hyperlink”; the subsequent “email in no way signals to 
Starke that he should click on the link, and it does not advise 
him that he would be deemed to agree to the contract terms in 
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the document to be found by clicking that link”; and the terms 
and conditions were both spatially and temporally decoupled from 
the purchase that Starke had made on Amazon.com. Id. at 292-94. 
These cases make clear that the inquiry whether a web user 
had “reasonable notice” of contract terms contained in a 
contract accessible by hyperlink depends on the “totality of the 
circumstances.” Id. at 296; Feld, 2020 WL 1047055, at *3 
(“Whether a user is on inquiry notice is a fact-intensive 
analysis.”) (citing Meyer, 868 F.3d at 76). These cases provide 
the framework for the inquiry in this case as to whether the 
plaintiff assented to the arbitration provision contained in the 
AAU Code Book by submitting his application for membership in 
the AAU and becoming a member of the AAU. 
B. 
In this case, the plaintiff had “reasonable notice” that by 
completing his application for AAU membership and becoming a 
member of the AAU, he would be bound by contractual language 
contained in the documents, including the binding arbitration 
provision, that could be accessed through the hyperlinks on the 
AAU application page. On the Website, an applicant’s “attention 
is adequately directed to a conspicuous hyperlink that is 
clearly identified as containing contractual terms to which the 
customer manifests assent” by completing the AAU membership 
application. Starke, 913 F.3d at 296. An applicant has 
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“reasonable notice” of the arbitration provision contained in 
the AAU Code Book based on several facts about the layout of the 
AAU membership application page. 
First, the AAU application page is relatively uncluttered. 
The relevant part of the application page is labeled “Terms and 
Conditions – Digital Signature” in large bold font. The section 
is in a distinctive yellow color. Within that section, the 
provisions of the AAU Code that a member agrees to comply with 
can be accessed through the hyperlinks and are marked with the 
distinctive blue color characteristic of hyperlinks.4 Although 
the membership application page has various colors, the layout 
is not distracting like the layout of the web page in Nicosia in 
which there were “between fifteen and twenty-five links,” in 
text of “at least four font sizes and six colors,” and various 
buttons and advertisements. 834 F.3d at 237. The relevant text 
in the “terms and conditions” box on the AAU application screen 
clearly draws a reasonable user’s attention to it because of the 
blue hyperlinks, the red asterisks, the normal font size, and 
the clear contrast between the mostly black text and the yellow 
background. See Peter v. DoorDash, Inc., -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020 
 
4 The plaintiff suggests that a reasonable user would be confused by the fact 
that there were multiple different terms and conditions. But as the plaintiff 
himself admits, he “remember[s] a section that talked about terms and 
conditions for background check and another yellow box that talked about 
terms and conditions of membership.” Hidalgo Decl. ¶ 10. There are two 
hyperlinks inside the “Terms and Conditions” box on the application and both 
hyperlinks would take a web user to the same AAU Code Book screen. 
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WL 1967568, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020) (“DoorDash’s sign-up 
page looks markedly similar to the page approved by 
Meyer . . . Despite plaintiff’s characterization of the font as 
gray-on-gray, the text contrasts clearly with the background and 
is plainly readable.”). The “terms and conditions” box is also 
prominently placed squarely in the middle of the very end of the 
application, which is a conspicuous part of the application 
because it is the last place an applicant looks before finishing 
the application process.  
Second, although the court in Meyer noted that reasonable 
notice was given, in part, because “the entire screen [was] 
visible at once, and the user [did] not need to scroll beyond 
what [was] immediately visible to find notice of the Terms of 
Service,” 868 F.3d at 78, the fact that an applicant would have 
to scroll down through many pages of the application to reach 
the terms and conditions box does not undermine the plaintiff’s 
assent to those terms and conditions. An applicant for AAU 
membership would be unable to avoid the part of the application 
containing the hyperlinks leading to the AAU Code Book because 
the applicant would necessarily proceed through the application 
in linear fashion and could not complete the application without 
having reviewed that page. 
Third, the agreement in this case is a clickwrap agreement 
in which an applicant necessarily checks the box adjacent to the 
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acknowledgment of the terms and conditions to indicate his 
agreement with the AAU terms and conditions listed, one of which 
is compliance with the contents of the AAU Code Book. The 
declaration of Debra Kimbrell shows that it would have been 
impossible for the plaintiff to complete his membership 
application without checking the box that gave assent to the 
terms and conditions. See Sultan v. Coinbase, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 
3d 156, 161-62 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). The plaintiff therefore assented 
to the terms and conditions when he checked the box indicating 
that he was aware of the existence of the clickwrap agreement. 
See Armstead v. Starbucks Corp., No. 17-cv-1163, 2017 WL 
5593519, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017) (“Meyer concluded that a 
party has typically consented to arbitration when she agreed to 
a ‘clickwrap’ or ‘click-through’ agreement.”). Moreover, the 
language that “[b]y submitting an application, the applicant 
agrees to comply with the provisions of the AAU Code,” contained 
in the “terms and conditions” box on the AAU application screen, 
is a “clear prompt directing users to read the [AAU Code Book] 
and signaling that their acceptance of the benefit of 
registration would be subject to contractual terms.” Meyer, 868 
F.3d at 78-79.5 
 
5 It appears that the plaintiff in this case also had actual notice that he 
would be bound by the terms and conditions in the AAU Code. As the plaintiff 
stated in his declaration, he “remember[s] a section that talked about terms 
and conditions for background check and another yellow box that talked about 
terms and conditions of membership. The second terms and conditions box 
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Fourth, the fact that notice about the terms and conditions 
of AAU membership was both spatially and temporally coupled to 
the applicant’s submission of an application further indicates 
that the plaintiff had “reasonable notice” that he would be 
bound by the attendant terms and conditions upon becoming an AAU 
member. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78 (“In addition to being 
spatially coupled with the mechanism for manifesting assent – 
i.e., the register button – the notice is temporally coupled.”). 
In this case, the check box in which a user manifested assent to 
the terms and conditions contained in the AAU Code Book appeared 
in close proximity to the two hyperlinks to the AAU Code Book 
and all were contained within the box plainly labeled “Terms and 
Conditions – Digital Signature.” Notice of the terms and 
conditions of membership, including being bound by the contents 
of the AAU Code Book was also temporally coupled to the 
plaintiff’s application because notice appeared on the 
application page itself and therefore notice is given to an 
applicant “simultaneously to enrollment, thereby connecting the 
contractual terms to the services to which they apply.” Id. 
Based on these facts, the plaintiff had “reasonable notice” 
that upon completing his membership application with the AAU and 
 
talked about how membership was not guaranteed by just filling out the 
application and that members had to comply with the AAU Code and its 
constitution and rules.” Hidalgo Decl. ¶ 10. 
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becoming a member, he would be bound by the arbitration 
provision indisputably contained in the AAU Code Book that could 
be accessed through the hyperlinks conspicuously displayed on 
the AAU membership application page. The plaintiff’s arguments 
to the contrary are without merit. 
The plaintiff argues that because he applied for membership 
on an iPhone using a web browser and the AAU application was not 
compatible for smartphone use, he did not have reasonable notice 
that he would be bound by the AAU Code Book. Specifically, the 
plaintiff complains that he “had to move the screen back and 
forth for each line of text” and zoom in and out because the 
full application was not visible on the iPhone screen at one 
time. Hidalgo Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. A. However, the plaintiff does not 
dispute that even though he used his iPhone to complete the 
membership application, there was a check box for him to click 
to agree to the “terms and conditions.” In fact, the plaintiff 
states that he remembers seeing the “terms and conditions” box 
when he applied for membership. The plaintiff therefore had 
reasonable notice of the need to agree to the terms and 
conditions even though he used an iPhone to complete his AAU 
membership application. 
In any event, the relevant question is whether a 
“reasonably prudent smartphone user” would have inquiry notice 
that he would be bound by the contract provisions contained in 
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the AAU Code Book upon completing the AAU membership 
application. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77-78. The plaintiff points 
to no authority for the proposition that a reasonably prudent 
smartphone user does not have inquiry notice of terms and 
conditions when the user physically checks a box indicating that 
the user understands and agrees to the terms and conditions. See 
Peter, 2020 WL 1967568, at *4 (finding that in the context of 
the plaintiffs’ argument that the terms and conditions would not 
have been readable on a smartphone that “Plaintiffs cite no 
authority regarding acceptable font size in the digital 
context.”). Moreover, the plaintiff fails to articulate why a 
“reasonably prudent smartphone user” would not have reasonable 
notice of the hyperlinks on the AAU application page simply 
because the smartphone user had to scroll around and zoom in and 
out on certain text on the smartphone screen to complete the 
application. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77-78.  
The plaintiff also argues that he should not be bound by 
the arbitration provision in the AAU Code Book because it was 
not obvious that the AAU Code Book contained contractual 
language rather than simply a general code of conduct governing 
matters like sportsmanship at AAU events. The text in the 
application stated that “Membership in any category may be 
granted only after an application is submitted and approved. By 
submitting an application, the applicant agrees to comply with 
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the provisions of the AAU Code, including its constitution, 
bylaws, policies, procedures, regulations, and rules.” Kimbrell 
Decl. ¶ 7 (color in original). The plaintiff provides no support 
for the argument that the phrase “the AAU Code, including its 
constitution, bylaws, policies, procedures, regulations, and 
rules” does not provide “reasonable notice” to an applicant that 
the applicant could be bound contractually by provisions 
contained in the AAU Code. The relevant portion of the AAU 
membership application is labeled “Terms and Conditions – 
Digital Signature,” which is standard language used in web-based 
contracts to indicate the existence of contractual language. See 
generally, Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78 (discussing Uber’s “terms and 
conditions”). There is no merit or authority for the plaintiff’s 
argument that he did not have “reasonable notice” that the AAU 
Code Book created an enforceable contract between the parties. 
The plaintiff also argues that because the arbitration 
provision was allegedly “hidden” in the middle of the roughly 
170-page AAU Code Book accessible through the hyperlinks, he did 
not have notice of the arbitration provision. But the fact that 
an applicant on the AAU Website, such as the plaintiff, was 
required to click through multiple hyperlinks - first to the AAU 
Code Book, then to the “Policies” chapter – to reach the 
specific part of the AAU Code Book containing the arbitration 
provision does not mean that the plaintiff cannot be bound by 
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the arbitration provision because “clicking the hyperlinked 
phrase is the twenty-first century equivalent of turning over 
the cruise ticket [containing an enforceable forum-selection 
clause at issue in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 
U.S. 585, 587-88 (1991)]” to read the fine print. Fteja v. 
Facebook, 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Feld, 2020 
WL 1047055, at *5 (“Whether Feld actually clicked on the 
hyperlinked terms to read the TOS or the Privacy Policy is 
immaterial; what matters is that notice of these terms was 
reasonably conspicuous.”). 
The plaintiff’s argument that he cannot be bound by the 
arbitration provision because he either did not or could not 
have been expected to read the full 170-page document contained 
in the AAU Code Book runs counter to well-settled principles of 
contract law. Under “New York law, a customer does not have the 
right to avoid a contract on the ground that he did not read 
it.” Crewe v. Rich Dad Educ., LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 60, 73-74 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases); Ragone v. Atl. Video at 
Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Further, 
Ragone asserts that she did not read the arbitration agreement 
before signing it. But this is of no moment . . . .”). 
Additionally, an applicant would not have to scroll through the 
entire roughly 170-page AAU Code Book because the AAU Code Book 
Screen contained a much shorter table of contents. Under the 
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“Policies” section of the AAU Code Book table of contents was a 
section clearly labeled “Binding Arbitration.”  
The plaintiff has failed to raise any issue of triable fact 
as to whether he had “reasonable notice” that he would be bound 
by the arbitration provision contained in the AAU Code Book upon 
completing his application for membership in the AAU. There is 
therefore no dispute that the plaintiff assented to the 
arbitration provision when he checked the box on the AAU 
membership application page indicating his agreement with all 
the terms and conditions listed and then submitted the 
membership application. See Sultan, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 162. 
C. 
 The next question is whether the particular claims brought 
by the plaintiff against the defendant are within the scope of 
the arbitration provision. 
The arbitration provision provides that “by applying for 
AAU membership (or having a third party submit an application 
for membership in the AAU on behalf of the application), or upon 
entering any AAU event, the applicant/member/entrant and the AAU 
agree to submit all civil dispute(s) arising out of or during 
the term of membership to binding arbitration administered by 
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in accordance with 
its consumer arbitration rules.” Kimbrell Decl., Ex. C. The 
arbitration provision further provides that “the parties declare 
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that it is their clear and unmistakable intent for the 
arbitrator to determine any and all questions of arbitrability, 
if any. Any objection to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, 
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or 
validity of the arbitration agreement shall be decided by the 
arbitrator.” Id. 
 The plaintiff argues principally that because the 
plaintiff’s payment information was stolen from AAU’s website 
when he applied for membership on May 16, 2019, thirteen days 
before the plaintiff’s AAU membership began, the dispute between 
the plaintiff and the defendant in this case does not “arise[e] 
out of or during the term of membership[.]” 
 However, this Court cannot decide the issue whether the 
dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant is arbitrable 
because the parties agreed to “empower an arbitrator to decide 
issues of arbitrability,” and that empowerment “serves as clear 
and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate 
such issues to an arbitrator.” Contec Corp., 398 F.3d at 208. 
Courts have upheld and enforced delegation clauses similar to 
the clause in this case, which principally states that “it is 
[the parties’] clear and unmistakable intent for the arbitrator 
to determine any and all questions of arbitrability, if any” and 
that “[a]ny objection to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, 
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or 
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validity of the arbitration agreement shall be decided by the 
arbitrator.” See, e.g., Mumin v. Uber Techs., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 
3d 507, 522-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).6 
 In light of the broad delegation to the arbitrator of 
issues of arbitrability, the plaintiff’s argument that his 
claims are not covered by the arbitration provision because the 
claims do not “aris[e] out of or during the term of membership” 
is an argument that must be submitted to the arbitrator in the 
first instance. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, 
Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019) (“When the parties’ contract 
delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court 
may not override the contract. In those circumstances, a court 
possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue. That is 
true even if the court thinks that the argument that the 
arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is wholly 
groundless.”); Olsen v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Nos. 18-cv-3388 
 
6 Although the defendant did not rely on the arbitration provision’s clause 
stating that arbitration between the parties will be “administered by the 
American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) in accordance with its consumer 
arbitration rules” for the argument that the arbitrator must decide issues of 
arbitrability, the incorporation of AAA rules in the arbitration provision 
constitutes independent “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties 
intended that the arbitrator decide issues of arbitrability. See Sollinger v. 
SmileDirectClub, LLC, No. 19-cv-5977, 2020 WL 774135, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
18, 2020) (“One example of ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ is the parties’ 
choice to ‘incorporate by reference the Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association,’ because the AAA’s rules include an instruction that arbitrators 
are to determine their own jurisdiction.”) (alterations omitted) (quoting 
Contec Corp., 398 F.3d at 211), appeal docketed, No. 20-965 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 
2020); Offshore Exploration and Production LLC v. Morgan Stanley Private 
Bank, N.A., 986 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same), aff’d, 626 F. 
App’x (2d Cir. 2015). 
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& 18-cv-4972, 2019 WL 3779190, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2019). 
Therefore, all of the plaintiff’s claims must be submitted to 
arbitration as provided for in the arbitration provision 
contained in the AAU Code Book. It will be for the arbitrator to 
decide whether any of the plaintiff’s claims are beyond the 
scope of the arbitration agreement. 
IV. 
 The defendant requests that the Court stay this case 
pending arbitration if it grants the defendant’s motion to 
compel arbitration. 
 The FAA provides that where a court is called upon to 
adjudicate a motion to compel arbitration, “the court in which 
such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue 
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the 
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has 
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, 
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in 
proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. A stay of the 
proceedings is mandatory “after all claims have been referred to 
arbitration and a stay [has been] requested.” Katz v. Cellco 
P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 In this case, all claims have been ordered to be submitted 
to arbitration and the defendant has requested that the Court 
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enter a stay of proceedings in this Court pending the outcome of 
the arbitration. Therefore, this case is stayed pending the 
outcome of the arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Court has considered all of the arguments of the 
parties. To the extent not discussed above, the arguments are 
either moot or without merit. The motion to compel arbitration 
is granted. The motion to stay this action pending the outcome 
of arbitration is granted. The parties should report back to the 
Court promptly at the conclusion of the arbitration. The Clerk 
is directed to stay this case. The Clerk is also directed to 
close Docket Nos. 10 and 24. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: New York, New York 
  June 16, 2020                 
 
       ____ /s/ John G. Koeltl_____ 
              John G. Koeltl 
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